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Abstract   Self management of natural resources has started to gain increasing at-
tention as an alternative tool to command-and-control and market-based tools, but 
the fundamental question remains: is self management economically beneficial such 
that it should be promoted in the first place? This article uses a unique set of survey 
data from South Korea and applies an empirical strategy to provide some of the first 
quantitative evidence that self management is benefiting the fishermen. We find that 
positive benefits of fishery self management—an increase in fishery revenue and 
reduction in cost—are perceived by member fishermen, which is a good start consid-
ering the average number of years since the establishment of these self-management 
groups is only about seven. Empirical results of the magnitude of change in profit 
showed some consistent results, although the estimates were not as robust. These re-
sults suggest that the impact of fishery self management is still in progress. Thus, the 
government should maintain its current position to support self management as the 
country’s fishery management policy.
Key words   Self management, club goods, matching methods, coastal fishery, South 
Korea.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, D71.
Introduction
Self management of natural resources has started to gain increasing attention as an al-
ternative tool to command-and-control and market-based tools (e.g., Cunningham and 
Bostock 2005; Wilson, Nielsen, and Dengbol 2003; ostrom et al. 2002; Townsend, Shot-
ton, and Uchida 2008). Self management, in which natural resource users decide on the 
rules, is said to have advantages over command-and-control in parts of the world where 
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the government’s capacity is weak in enforcement and monitoring, or where it lacks 
institutional capacity to implement a market-based tool, such as an individual transfer-
able quota system. Self management of natural resources has been in existence for long 
time—decades if not centuries—in many parts of the world. However, the concept was 
rediscovered in the fisheries literature not so long ago (Jentoft 2003).
 For self management of natural resources to be successful, however, the mere setting 
of rules by the natural resource users is not sufficient. Based on the theory of clubs, the 
group of natural resource users need to be “privileged” (Buchanan 1965); e.g., managing 
the natural resource as a group needs to bring higher present value of benefits to its mem-
bers than the status quo. This higher present value of benefits, therefore, is an incentive 
constraint of forming and maintaining a self-management group. 
 Despite the importance of this incentive constraint, existing literature has not em-
pirically examined the impact of forming a self-management group on profitability. This 
is primarily due to the lack of adequate data. Large sample data on self management of 
common pool resources is rarely available. Even if such a dataset is available, it often is 
aggregated, cross-sectional and/or cross-country data, where the challenge to control for 
heterogeneity among countries, let alone unobservables, can be overwhelming (Agrawal 
2001). For these reasons, many previous empirical studies are conducted on specific 
cases, often not focusing directly on the effect of self management but on how or if such 
a resource management regime can be maintained (Gaspart and Seki 2003; Platteau 
and Seki 2007; Schott et al. 2007). Thus, the critical question is left unanswered: is self 
management economically beneficial to resource users such that they have incentives to 
sustain the resource management regime?
 To address this question, this article empirically investigates whether or not self 
management has improved economic outcomes in the context of fishery management. 
We examine the South Korean experience with coastal fisheries management. The advan-
tages of studying Korean fishery self management are that a large number of groups have 
formed in recent years, and the specific rules adopted by the groups and fishery character-
istics vary across groups. At the same time, however, all of the groups function under the 
same national fishery regulations and, to certain extent, share a common set of cultural 
and social characteristics. These advantages enable us to utilize wide variation in key 
fishery-related variables while controlling for other influential, but latent, disturbances.
 The overall goal of this study is to quantify the effectiveness of self management and 
its institutional arrangements on profitability of the small-scale fishing households in Ko-
rea. The principal contribution of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the impact 
of self management on fishermen’s profitability. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to quantitatively identify the economic impact of a self-regulatory approach 
of fish resources using data collected systematically at the individual resource user level, 
consisting of both members and non-members of self-management groups.
 To meet this goal, we capitalize on a unique setting in South Korea which has an ap-
pealing institutional setting to study these questions. In 2001, South Korea instituted a 
policy to encourage voluntary self-management groups for fishery management. By 2007, 
more than 580 groups had formed. The groups have a rich variation in terms of targeted 
species and gear types. They also have introduced a variety of self-imposed rules; 25 
rules were identified by the authors, ranging from effort coordination measures, fishing 
operation restrictions, and quality control activities. At the same time, there still exist nu-
merous fishermen who are not members of any self-management groups. 
 To understand the economic impact of forming these self-management groups, we 
utilize a dataset from a survey that we designed and implemented to a total of 306 fisher-
men, including those who are members of self-management groups and those who are 
not. In identifying the effect of membership in a self-management group, we control for 
self selection by employing covariate matching method. Overall, we find strong evidence 
that membership in a self-management group has benefits on both revenue and cost com-
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pared to non-members, but there is weaker evidence on the actual extent of the increase 
in profitability. 
Conceptual Framework: Theory of Clubs
our conceptual framework is based on the theory of clubs (Buchanan 1965). A club is 
defined as a group of individuals deriving mutual benefits from sharing a class of public 
goods characterized by excludability and some rivalry in the form of congestion. The 
theory shows that such impure public goods, which lie between private goods (with com-
plete rivalry and costless exclusion) and pure public goods (complete non-rivalry and 
infeasible exclusion), can be converted and provided as club goods. As such, a club is 
viewed as a private, non-governmental alternative provider of such impure public goods. 
 Fish resources, unless managed under an individual quota scheme, are common 
property resources and thus categorized as impure public goods. Unlike pure public 
goods, fish harvest is subject to rivalry—fish that were harvested by one fisherman cannot 
be harvested by someone else. If the fish resources have open access, they remain non-
excludable. With limited access, however, such as through licensing or establishment of 
territorial user rights fisheries (TURF), fish resources can be made excludable to a vary-
ing degree. However, even with limited access and some excludability, fish resources can 
still be subject to overexploitation. For example, if the number of incumbent fishermen 
is too large—which is often the case—then non-excludability of the resources among 
the license holders or TURF members creates incentive structure similar to that of open 
access; i.e., race to fish. Race to fish will lead to overexploitation of the resources, over-
investment (capital stuffing), and rent dissipation. 
 One way to overcome overexploitation is to convert the fish resources to club goods. 
If successfully converted to a club good, members of the club would reap a stream of 
rents from the resources to which only the members have exclusive use rights. The size of 
the club membership and the level of the resource stock will determine the optimum such 
that the resource is used to sustain the rents over time. However, based on the theory of 
clubs, three conditions need to hold in order to transform the resources into club goods. 
First, fishing ground boundaries need to be defined in accordance to the ecology of the 
targeted fish so that only members have exclusive use rights to the fish. Second, group 
membership needs to be well-defined and controlled. Finally, and most importantly from 
the perspective of this study, the groups need to be “privileged”; that is, forming a group 
needs to bring higher present value of benefits to each member than nonmembers and the 
status quo. The first two conditions are related to excludability, while the third is related 
to profitability or an incentive compatibility constraint of forming and maintaining a club. 
These conditions are also interrelated; whether a club is privileged or not depends on how 
well the benefits are made exclusive to its members.
 The excludability condition can be achieved in several ways. one example is the 
license system, where membership is defined by the possession of a license. Another ex-
ample is forming a fishermen’s group, such as cooperatives in Alaska and sectors in the 
US Northeast groundfish fishery. In both examples, enforcement and monitoring of the 
violators will become key to providing exclusive use rights successfully.
 The privileged condition is the most challenging to meet. There are several ways 
which clubs can bring higher profit to their members. Activities that could increase reve-
nues or reduce costs often require some critical mass to be effective, or have a public good 
nature so that no single individual will voluntarily pursue them. An example is reducing 
harvest in order to rebuild the fish stock. This is effective only if done by most, if not all, 
harvesters, and no single fisherman will do it voluntarily. Maintaining fishing grounds, 
monitoring illegal fishing, sharing information on fishing spots and market prices, direct 
marketing, and quality control are other measures that self-management groups may adopt 
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to meet the privileged condition. These measures would be more successful if fishermen 
coordinate as a group. Case studies from Japan and elsewhere demonstrate anecdotal evi-
dence where combinations of these activities have brought higher profits to the cooperative 
(club) members (e.g., Makino 2008; Uchida and Baba 2008; Uchida and Watanobe 2008).
 A discussion on the feasibility of a self-management group—a club—and the type 
of targeted species in fisheries is in order. The conventional wisdom is that the less mo-
bile the species, the better the chance of successful self management (e.g., ostrom et 
al. 2002). Does this mean that migratory and pelagic species are ruled out? Anecdotal 
evidence shows that this is not necessarily the case; examples include: UK’s Shetland 
Fish Producers Organization targeting white fish (e.g., haddock, cod, hake, and monkfish) 
(Anderson 2008), Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association and Rhode Is-
land Fluke Conservation Cooperative in the US targeting groundfish (e.g., Johnston and 
Sutinen 2009), and Hiyama Walleye Pollack Long Line Association in Japan targeting 
highly migratory pollack (Uchida and Watanobe 2008). There are two important points to 
note. First, it is not the fish per se that needs to be exclusive, rather it is the benefit—eco-
nomic returns to be specific—from the fishery. This explains why many self-management 
groups engage in marketing activities such as quality control and developing a private 
brand. Second, excludability need not be spillover proof. As long as the group members 
receive higher net benefits than before formation of the group and compared to the cur-
rent non-members, it is incentive compatible for members to maintain the group.
 Lastly, with respect to the privileged condition, are low-valued species ruled out un-
der this conceptual framework? Again, anecdotal evidence shows it is not necessarily so. 
One example is the clam fishery on the central Pacific coast of Japan, where the average 
annual revenue per fisherman is a mere 3 million yen (US$30,000). This is hardly enough 
to support a family, yet this self-management group is one of the often-cited success-
ful groups. The reason is that revenue from this clam fishery is very stable and reliable 
compared to the shirasu (juvenile sardine) fishery, which was the group’s main revenue 
source. It is the insurance-like benefit, not the revenue level, of this clam fishery that 
maintains its self-management group.1 That said, such benefits and information are dif-
ficult to quantify or solicit through a survey. As such, in this study we attempt to identify 
quantitatively the impact of self management on fishermen’s profitability.
Self Management of Fisheries in South Korea
South Korea provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of forming self-manage-
ment groups on economic outcomes. As elsewhere, despite the government’s effort to 
manage fisheries primarily through licensing and permit systems, Korea has still suffered 
from the problems of “race-to-fish” and stock depletion (Cheong 2004). Profitability of 
fisheries declined due to the vicious cycle of overcompetition, stock depletion, and capital 
stuffing. Illegal fishing persisted and aggravated the stock depletion problem despite cost-
ly monitoring and enforcement efforts. Fishing grounds suffered from conflicts among 
fishermen. Fishermen became prone to rely on government subsidy or other favorable 
policies. Rising international competition with cheaper imported seafood led to lower 
output prices. All of these conditions created a growing need for an alternative approach 
to the traditional command-and-control. 
 In response, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries initiated a policy in 2001 to 
encourage South Korean fishermen to form voluntary self-management groups and manage 
fisheries through self-regulated regimes (jayul gwanry fishery). These groups are typically 
established based on the fishing community organizations called ochongye. Under the new 
1 From an interview conducted on 2005/10/14 with Dr. Akira Nihira of the Ibaraki Prefectural Freshwater Fish-
eries Research Institute.
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policy, fishermen can voluntarily form self-management committees, propose a set of self 
regulations to the government, and if approved, implement the rules. In response, the gov-
ernment gives stronger responsibility and authority to the groups to manage fishing grounds, 
stocks, and harvests. In addition to administrative and technical support to implement the 
self-management plans, the government also provides financial rewards to self-management 
groups with good performance records to incentivize more fishermen to form groups. In 
2007 the government provided 11.8 billion KW (US$9.8 million) to 90 self-management 
groups (20% of the total number of self-management groups). These payments are made to 
the groups and not to the individual members; the regulations require that the money be re-
invested in self-management activities. Typically the groups spend the money for restocking 
and business startup, such as direct-sale shops and restaurants.
 Fisheries in South Korea can be categorized broadly into four types: maul, coastal, 
offshore, and aquaculture (Lee, Gates, and Lee 2006). A maul fishery is one that manages 
clams or other sedentary species in designated areas. over 50% of the 579 self-manage-
ment groups in 2007 were of this type (table 1). Coastal fisheries, which are the focus of 
this article, involve fishing vessels of less than eight gross tons operating in areas where 
fishermen fish and return to the departure port within a day. Eighteen percent of the self-
management groups are associated with coastal fisheries, and another 16% are those 
engaged in both maul and coastal fisheries. Offshore fisheries involve fishing vessels 
greater than eight gross tons operating in areas where fishermen fish and return to the de-
parture port within two or three days. Offshore fisheries typically target highly migratory 
species and often compete with foreign vessels. While a few self-management groups ex-
ist in offshore fisheries, because of these distinctive characteristics they are not included 
in our analysis. Lastly, 12% of the self-management groups are engaged in aquaculture. 
 As a result of government policy that promotes self management, the number of such 
groups and their members grew rapidly (table 1). Starting from 63 groups in 2001, by 
2007 the total number of self-management groups had grown to 579. The number of par-
ticipating fishermen has also steadily increased from 5,407 in 2001 to 10,765 in 2003 and 
44,061 in 2007. Currently, the average number of member fishermen in each community 
is about 70 to 80. The government aims to establish 1,000 self-management groups by 
2011 and in all of approximately 2,000 fishing communities after 2012. Despite the rapid 
expansion in the number of self-management groups, however, there is little evidence on 
the economic performance of this new approach to fisheries management. 
Data and Descriptive Characteristics
We use a dataset from surveys that we designed and implemented in 2008. The surveys 
were conducted among leaders of self-management groups and individual fishermen, 
which included both members and non-members of such groups. This dataset is believed 
to be the only existing dataset that includes individual fishermen of both members and 
non-members of self-management groups in South Korea. The descriptive statistics for 
the key variables discussed here are shown in tables 2 through 4.
 The group leader survey employed a stratified sampling strategy designed to col-
lect data on a sample of 33 group leaders engaged in coastal fisheries.2 As of December 
2007, there were 102 self-management groups engaged in coastal fisheries (Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 2008). of these, we were able to obtain a contact list of 
92 groups. Among them, 30 self-management groups were established in or after 2006. 
Due to a concern that two years would be too short of a time period to detect the impact 
of group establishment, we excluded those groups from the sampling frame and focused 
2 The secretary general of the self-management group responded to the survey when he/she was most knowl-
edgeable about the fishery's management. 
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on self-management groups that have been active for at least three years at the time of the 
survey. of the remaining groups, we then focused our sampling frame on fisheries types 
for which we could find comparable fishermen who were engaged in the same fisheries 
in the same region but were not a member of any self-management group. As a result, we 
dropped 27 self-management groups in the net fishery and king crab fishery since there 
were few or no fishermen who were engaged in these fisheries but not a member of any 
self-management group. of the remaining 35 groups, leaders of two groups refused to re-
spond to the survey. We, therefore, received 33 valid responses from group leaders. 
 To enlist the fishermen from these 33 groups for individual surveys, ideally we would 
construct a sampling frame from a list of all fishermen in those groups and a list of all 
fishermen who are not members of those groups but are engaging in the same fisheries in 
the same fishing community (ochongye). Such lists, however, do not exist. As an alterna-
tive, we asked each leader to give us a list of fishermen from two categories: those who are 
members of the self-management group and non-members who are in the same fisheries 
in the same community. of the 33 group leaders, 32 of them provided contact information 
for one or more fishermen. However, leaders of seven groups could not provide any non-
member information, since most or all of the fishermen in their fishing communities were 
already members. In these cases, we selected fishing communities that were geographi-
cally the closest to each self-management group. Some groups included an equal number 
of both member and non-member fishermen; others included fishermen in only one of the 
categories. In our data, seven groups include only fishermen who are members of a self-
management group. This sampling strategy and the resulting imbalance of member and 
non-member fishermen representing each group motivated our identification strategy.
 In the end, we obtained individual data from 182 fishermen who were members of 
one of the 33 self-management groups in the survey (hereafter called “member fishermen”) 
and 124 fishermen who were not a member of any self-management group (hereafter 
called “non-member fishermen”) from 64 different fishing communities or fishery associa-
tions. The survey instruments were pretested and revised prior to full implementation. The 
survey was conducted by telephone by experienced and trained enumerators. The response 
rate was approximately 70%. A caveat of our data set is the potential recall bias in the in-
formation for the period before engaging in self-management groups. However, there is no 
individual-level data available from the period prior to the policy due to the government’s 
quick decision to implement the program. We designed the survey carefully and trained 
and monitored the enumerators to minimize recall bias and ensure that the best account of 
past amounts and activities was given by the respondents.
Characteristics of the Self-management Groups
Based on the group leader survey data, we find that self-management groups among 
coastal fisheries in South Korea adopt various ways to provide excludability and incentive 
compatibility to their members (table 2). The types of rules can be grouped into four cat-
egories: agreements on effort coordination, operational restrictions, revenue sharing, and 
quality control measures. Among the different types of agreements on effort coordination, 
several activities are adopted by a high percentage of the interviewed self-management 
groups: cleaning the fishing ground (94%), monitoring illegal fishing (70%), removing 
harmful species (70%), and information exchange (64%). More than half of the groups 
engaged in a joint search for hot spots and restocking of targeted fish. Eight groups also 
either assign or rotate fishing grounds. Self-management groups have adopted a number 
of operational restrictions as well. The most popular measures are size/age limits and 
seasonal closures, which are adopted by more than two-thirds of the groups. Nearly half 
of the groups control mesh size, the number of fishing gear, aggregate supply, duration 
of fishing operations, and designation of protected areas. Finally, some groups also have 
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Table 2
Number and Proportion of Self-management Groups in the Sample
Adopting Specific Rules, 2007
                                                           Proportion of Total
                                                                         Number of Groups Groups Surveyed (%)
Agreements on Effort Coordination
Cleaning fishing ground 31 94
Monitoring of illegal fishing 23 70
Removing harmful species 23 70
Information exchange 21 64
Joint search for hot spots 17 52
Restocking 17 52
Establishing artificial reefs 16 48
Assign/rotate fishing grounds 8 24
Agreements on Operational Restrictions  
Size/age limit 22 67
Seasonal closure 22 67
Mesh size 16 48
Number of fishing gear 16 48
Supply control 15 45
operating hours limit 15 45
operating days limit 15 45
Protected area 15 45
Total catch limit 14 42
Fishing gear type 11 33
Other restrictions on fishing gear 7 21
Gross tonnage 6 18
Number of fishing vessels 5 15
Revenue Sharing  
Revenue sharing among group members 1 3
Quality Control  
Joint marketing 15 45
Quality control of catch 8 24
Development of new products 5 15
Total number of groups 33 
Source: Authors’ survey.
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adopted quality control measures. Nearly half of the groups coordinate marketing of their 
fish (45%) and a quarter of them conduct quality control of their catch (24%). A few also 
jointly develop new products (15%). only one self-management group in our sample ad-
opted some sort of a revenue sharing rule among group members.
 Interestingly, the 33 self-management groups in our sample adopt unique combina-
tions of rules; i.e., none of the groups have the same combination of rules. For this reason, 
we unfortunately cannot identify the impact of a specific rule or a combination of rules on 
the economic outcomes. Therefore, in the rest of the article, we will examine the impact 
of self-management groups as a whole on economic outcomes. 
 The group leader survey revealed an interesting set of characteristics of the self-
management groups engaged in coastal fisheries (table 3). The group size is around 71 
fishermen, which is comparable to the national average (table 1, last row). On average, 
52 vessels go out on an average fishing day, suggesting that some boats are operated by 
more than one member. Their vessel size is relatively small, an average of 7.4 tons. In 24 
self-management groups in our sample, there are fishermen in the same community who 
are engaged in the same fisheries but are not members of the self-management group. In 
roughly one-third of the groups (10 groups), all members of the community engaged in the 
same fisheries as members of the self-management group. However, among the remain-
ing two-thirds, the number of fishermen not participating in the self-management group is 
213, on average, with a wide range of from 5 to 4,000. The average number of years since 
establishment is seven, suggesting that many of these groups were established at the time 
of the government policy in 2001 which introduced monetary incentives for fishermen to 
form self-management groups. Membership in a self-management group was voluntary 
for most fishermen in our sample (94%). This finding implies that we would need to con-
trol for self-selection bias in estimating the impact of group membership. Although most 
groups do not make membership mandatory, more than 60% of the groups require some 
sort of a membership fee. of eight groups that gave a valid answer to the question regard-
ing the level of membership fee, the average was 98 thousand KW (US$1=1,720 KW). 
Compared to the average total revenue of fishermen who are members of a self-manage-
ment group (60 million KW), the membership fee can be considered modest.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of the Self-management Groups, 2007
 
                                                                                                    Sample Mean (standard deviation)
Number of fishermen in the self-management group  70.70  (61.69)
Number of fishermen in the ochongye who are in the  212.66  (762.99)
same fisheries but not in the self-management group 
Average age of fishermen 51.29  (6.08)
Total number of vessels on an average fishing day 52.09  (50.03)
Average tonnage of vessels in the self-management group 7.41  (11.79)
Number of years since establishment of the self-management group 6.68  (4.27)
Percent of groups in which the members have the 93.75  (0.25)
autonomy of whether or not to join the group 
Percent of groups that require a membership fee 60.61  (0.50)
Average membership fee (1,000 KW)* 97.50  (175.40)
Source: Authors’ data.  Notes: The total number of group leaders interviewed was 33. Valid responses for each ques-
tion vary within a range of 29–33. * Does not include zero values. US$1 is approximately 1,160 Korean won (KW).
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Profitability
Based on the descriptive statistics, the two types of fishermen are also statistically similar 
in terms of economic outcomes. The average total revenue in 2007 was approximately 
65 million KW and the total cost was 35 million KW, with no statistically significant 
difference between the member and non-member fishermen (table 4, rows 1 and 2). We 
find that both types of fishermen, on average, experienced a decrease in revenue and 
an increase in cost since joining a self-management group or since 2002 in the case of 
non-members (table 4, rows 3 and 4).3 Using the full sample, nearly 75% of the mem-
ber fishermen said their total revenue decreased since joining a self-management group, 
whereas about 85% of the non-members said their total revenue decreased since 2002. 
on average, the direction of the change in revenue is negative for both groups, with more 
non-member fishermen experiencing a decline. Likewise, although both groups expe-
rienced an increase in total cost, more non-member fishermen experienced an increase 
in cost. The difference in means for the restricted sample, which is a subset of the full 
sample that responded to all questions pertaining to the economic outcomes, was statisti-
cally significant at the 20% level for the directional change in total revenue and 10% for 
the directional change in total cost. Otherwise, we find that there are no significant differ-
ences between fishermen in the restricted sample and those not in the restricted sample 
except for income; the restricted sample has a higher mean income category compared to 
the full sample.
 Although the direction of change in revenues and costs over the years is informa-
tive when evaluating the effect of joining a self-management group, a caveat with these 
variables is that the baseline year is different among fishermen. For all non-member fish-
ermen, the baseline year is 2002. For member fishermen, the reference year is one year 
prior to joining a self-management group, which differs depending to which of the 33 
groups the fisherman belongs. Still, the reference year for 70% of the member fishermen 
in our sample is either 2001 or 2002, implying that the reference year for most fishermen 
in our sample is similar, but the issue of different base years still remains.
 For a better comparison, we utilize the information on changes in total revenue and 
total cost in the reference year compared to 2007 and create new variables that indicate 
the annual growth rate in total profit, revenue, and cost (table 4, rows 5 through 7). We 
find that both types of fishermen experienced a high growth rate per year in profit, with 
an average of 33% per year for member fishermen and 38% for non-member fishermen. 
Not only did the revenue increased on average, but the total cost decreased. The average 
growth rate in total revenue was 2.0% for member fishermen and 2.4% for non-member 
fishermen, and the average growth rate in total cost was –7.5% for member fishermen and 
–6.1% for the non-member fishermen. At first look, these trends seem somewhat contra-
dictory compared to the directional change in costs and revenues (rows 3 and 4). This 
result could stem from the possibility that the fishermen who responded to these questions 
may have experienced a larger increase in revenue and a larger decrease in costs than the 
full sample. In fact, the downside of these annual growth rate indicators is that only a 
subset of the respondents provided valid responses to the questions related to changes in 
revenues and costs in the baseline year. Given the advantages and disadvantages of these 
two sets of economic outcome indicators—directional change and annual growth rate—
we utilize both of them in the subsequent analyses.
3 In our survey, we wanted to capture the change in revenue and cost before and after joining a self-management 
group. We requested 2007 revenue and cost data from all fishermen. However, given that fishermen joined 
self-management groups in different years, we asked each fisherman to consider one year prior to joining a self-
management group and asked for the revenue and cost information for that year. For the non-member fishermen, 
we asked for revenue and cost information for 2007 and 2002.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Fishermen’s Performance, Fishing Activities, 
and Socioeconomic Characteristics Using Sampling Weights
Self-management vs. Non Self-management Fishermen, 2007
                                      
             Self-management Group
                                                            Members           Non-members
                                                      Full     Restricted    Full     Restricted 
               Sample   Sample†      Sample   Sample†
              (N=182)   (N=63)   (N=136)   (N=39)
                   (1)         (2)          (3)         (4) 
Average total fishery revenue in 2007 61.00 66.62 68.59 86.76
(million KW) (11.51) (14.32) (10.26) (13.87)
Average total fishery cost in 2007 30.14 35.96 40.84 52.27
(million KW) (7.07) (9.83) (6.35) (9.48)
Changes in revenue since 2002 or joining –0.40 –0.20 –0.59 –0.47
self-management groupa  (0.17) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15)
(1=increased, 0=no change, –1= decrease)
Changes in costs since 2002 or joining 0.66 0.74 0.81 0.91
self-management groupa  (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
(1=increased, 0=no change, –1=decrease) 
Average annual growth rate in profit since 2002 N.A. 33.11 N.A. 37.82
or joining self-management group (% change per year)   (8.07)  (11.29)
Average annual growth rate in revenue since 2002 N.A. 2.00 N.A. 2.38
or joining self-management group (% change per year)  (1.22)  (1.22)
Average annual growth rate in cost since 2002 N.A. –7.51 N.A. –6.08
or joining self-management group (% change per year)  (1.07)  (0.22)
Tonnage (tons) 5.23 5.04 4.43 5.17
 (1.01) (0.80) (0.49) (0.80)
Number of crew (persons) 2.39 2.14 2.82 2.75
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33)
Annual fishing days in 2007 198.65 200.98 198.81 199.17
 (6.00) (16.32) (7.07) (8.67)
Percentage of income from fishing 92.36* 92.57 85.59 85.65
 (2.72) (2.78) (3.00) (3.08)
Years of fishing experience 27.16 24.68 25.87 28.54
 (1.07) (1.95) (1.42) (2.37)
Income categoryb 3.74 4.14 3.80 4.18
 (0.25) (0.32) (0.24) (0.32)
Education attainmentc  2.10 2.08 2.02 1.82
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10)
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics of Fishermen’s Performance, Fishing Activities, 
and Socioeconomic Characteristics Using Sampling Weights
Self-management vs. Non Self-management Fishermen, 2007
                                      
             Self-management Group
                                                            Members           Non-members
                                                      Full     Restricted    Full     Restricted 
               Sample   Sample†      Sample   Sample†
              (N=182)   (N=63)   (N=136)   (N=39)
                   (1)         (2)          (3)         (4)
Age 53.70 53.33 54.95 55.54
 (0.81) (0.92) (0.93) (1.79)
Household size  2.97 3.11 2.68 2.74
 (0.14) (0.33) (0.15) (0.21)
Number of children (<18 years old) 0.48 0.67 0.67 0.68
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.13) (0.23)
Number of household members older than 65  0.37 0.36 0.26 0.31
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.10)
Source: Authors’ survey.
Notes: Linearized standard error in parentheses. * The difference in means is significant at the 10% level based 
on a one-tailed t-test. All other mean comparisons were statistically insignificant. The means are weighted us-
ing inverse probability. The number of sampled fishermen in a self-management group is 182; those not in a 
self-management group is 124. The number of valid responses differs depending on the variable. For the self-
management group members, revenues and costs are from the managed fisheries only, but not necessarily for a 
single species. “Household” is the typical unit of business in coastal fisheries, and thus the revenue and costs are 
those at the household level. For non-members, the revenues and costs are from the fisheries that generated the 
largest revenue for non-members. † The means are calculated only among respondents who answered both rev-
enue and cost and changes thereof over the years (63 self-management fishermen and 39 non self-management 
fishermen.)  a Although insignificant at the 10% level, the absolute value of t-statistics testing the difference 
between the two groups (restricted sample) in the means for change in total revenue was 1.31 (P-value=0.20) 
and for total cost was 1.66 (P-value=0.103). b The income categories are (in million KW): 1 <10 ; 2=10 to <20; 
3=20 to <30; 4=30 to <40; 5=40 to <50; 6=50 to <60; 7=60 to <70; 8=70 to <80; 9=80 to <100; and 10=>100.
c Education categories are 1 = middle school graduate; 2 = some high school; 3 = high school graduate; 4 = pro-
fessional college graduate; 5 = some college; and 6 = college graduate.
Descriptive Statistics: Members vs. Non-members
The individual-level fisherman survey revealed that members and non-members of a 
self-management group share a number of similar characteristics (table 4). There is no 
statistically significant difference in the key fishing characteristics, including average 
tonnage of vessels, number of crew members, and effort measured by total fishing days 
in 2007 (rows 8 to 10). The fishermen in our sample operate vessels of 4 to 5 tons. These 
vessels are slightly smaller than the group average derived from the group leader survey. 
Moreover, the member and non-member fishermen also share similar socioeconomic 
characteristics, including years of fishing experience, income level, education attain-
ment, age, household size, number of children, and number of household members over 
54 years old. The only characteristic that was significantly different at the 10% level was 
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percentage of income from fishing, with member fishermen, on average, having a share 
of more than 90% of income from fishing, compared to 86% for non-member fishermen. 
These common characteristics suggest that the two types of fishermen are comparable, 
which is an appropriate condition for identifying the impact of self-management groups 
on economic outcomes.
 To further understand the factors associated with membership in a self-management 
group, we compare results from two logit models (table 5). The dependent variable is 
a binary indicator of if the respondent is a member of a self-management group or not. 
Note that these logit models are for descriptive purposes rather than to identify causal 
effects. Model 1 includes variables related to socioeconomic characteristics of the fish-
ermen, fisheries characteristics, and regional fixed effects. Model 2 includes perception 
questions regarding the current status of their fisheries. 
 Overall, there are two key findings. On one hand, many of the coefficients are insig-
nificant, suggesting that the fishermen from the two groups are somewhat similar. This 
supports comparability of these fishermen. On the other hand, there are several variables 
that are associated with membership, which suggests that the two types of fishermen dif-
fer in some aspects and that they need to be controlled for when examining the effects 
of self management on economic outcomes. Based on Model 2, we find that fishermen 
that have lower incomes are younger, have more years of fishing experience, and are 
more likely to be members of a self-management group. Moreover, fishermen using trap 
nets are more likely to be a member compared to “other” gears (the dropped category). 
Fishermen who target shellfish are less likely to be members compared to those who 
target finfish. Some perceptions also are associated with group membership. Individuals 
who think there is capital stuffing and oversupply (and resulting price decrease) are more 
likely to be members. In our subsequent analyses, which identify the effect of self-man-
agement groups on economic outcomes, we control for all of these variables, except the 
perception questions.4
Empirical Strategy
In an ideal world, we can identify the impact of self-management groups on economic 
outcomes using the following model:
 
yi = β0 + β1selfmgti + εi,                                                  (1)
where yi is an economic outcome for an individual fisherman i; selfmgti is a dummy vari-
able indicating 1 if the individual fisherman is a member of a self-management group and 
0 otherwise; and εi is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β1.
Selection Bias
There are three key problems in identifying β1.The first key issue is self-selection bias. 
Since individual fishermen were not randomized into a self-management group, there 
could be systematic differences between those who did and those who did not become 
members of a self-management group that lead to differences in profitability. Although 
the descriptive statistics shown in the previous section indicated that member and non-
member fishermen are similar in most aspects, the results from the logit models showed 
4 We exclude the perception questions from the matching models since they ask about the current conditions of 
their fishery.
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Table 5
Factors of Membership in a Self-management Group Based on Logit Model
                                                                                             Dependent Variable: 1=Member of a 
                                                                                           Self-management Group; 0=otherwise
                                                           Model 1                          Model 2
Income category§ –0.025 –0.053**
 (1.26) (2.10)
Education attainment§ 0.016 0.025
 (0.50) (0.73)
Age –0.012** –0.018**
 (2.16) (2.29)
Proportion of income from fishery 0.005** 0.003
 (2.02) (0.95)
Total fishing days in 2007 –0.000 –0.000
 (0.19) (0.09)
Years of experience in fishing 0.007* 0.009**
 (1.73) (2.08)
Tonnage in 2007 0.027 0.034
 (1.31) (1.51)
Number of crew in 2007 –0.027 –0.033
 (1.02) (1.19)
Gear Type Variables†
  Gill net 0.104 0.064
 (0.57) (0.31)
  Trap net 0.361*** 0.366***
 (3.60) (3.83)
  Composite fishery 0.230 0.224
 (1.36) (1.12)
Species Variables†
  Crustacean –0.222 –0.227
 (1.36) (1.35)
  Shellfish –0.550*** –0.468**
 (3.06) (1.87)
  other 0.216 0.171
 (1.63) (1.27)
Region Variables†  
  Southeast region 0.007 –0.126
 (0.04) (0.59)
  North region 0.0047 –0.080
 (0.25) (0.44)
Resource stock is low due to overharvesting  –0.052 
  (1.05)
Overall fishing effort is declining  0.051
  (1.04)
There is overinvestment in vessels and gears  0.104**  
  (2.01)
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Table 5
Factors of Membership in a Self-management Group Based on Logit Model
                                                                                             Dependent Variable: 1=Member of a 
                                                                                           Self-management Group; 0=otherwise
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Income category§ –0.025 –0.053**
 (1.26) (2.10)
Education attainment§ 0.016 0.025
 (0.50) (0.73)
Age –0.012** –0.018**
 (2.16) (2.29)
Proportion of income from fishery 0.005** 0.003
 (2.02) (0.95)
Total fishing days in 2007 –0.000 –0.000
 (0.19) (0.09)
Years of experience in fishing 0.007* 0.009**
that some socioeconomic characteristics (lower income, younger, and more fishing experi-
ence) and fishery characteristics (using trap net and targeting species other than shellfish) are 
positively associated with membership. These factors could affect economic outcomes. For 
example, those with more fishing experience might have higher revenue and lower costs; this 
could lead to a positive selection bias. Fishermen using trap nets may have lower productiv-
ity and hence lower revenue, leading to a negative selection bias. Although the combined 
effect of selection bias is an empirical question, it is unlikely to be zero. Hence, applying 
ordinary least squares to equation (1) is unlikely to yield an unbiased treatment effect.
 To deal with self-selection bias, we utilize the covariate matching method. This method 
is used to examine the impact of a treatment (in our context, membership in a self-man-
agement group) on an outcome (in our case, profit, revenue, and cost) when selection takes 
place on observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Measuring the effect of 
group membership on economic outcome without bias using the matching method assumes 
that the outcome in the base state (economic outcome if the fisherman is not a member 
of a group) is independent of the treatment (being a member of a group), conditional on 
observed covariates. In other words, for fishermen within subgroups defined by the co-
variates, being a member of a self-management group is unrelated to what the economic 
outcome would be if the fisherman were not a member. This is the so-called Conditional 
Independence Assumption. If this assumption holds, we can say that given the observable 
covariates, the economic outcome of the non-member fishermen is what the economic out-
come of the member fishermen would have been had they not been a member. 
 Matching works by finding a non-member fisherman who is very similar to a member 
fisherman by conditioning on covariate variables nonparametrically (Black and Smith 2004). 
Moreover, with matching methods, we can impose “common support,” which excludes mem-
ber fishermen for whom we cannot reliably find a similar non-member fisherman. 
 We follow the recent literature and match using covariate matching and its variants.5 
Covariate matching matches directly on covariates. In our analysis, we choose to match 
the two nearest neighbors with the same (similar) covariates (Zi). The member and non-
member fishermen are matched on income, educational attainment, age, proportion of 
income from fishing, annual fishing days, tonnage, size of crew, region, gear type, and target 
5 Using the Monte Carlo simulation, Zhao (2004) showed that with small sample size (500 or less), covariate 
matching is preferred over propensity score matching.
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species. In particular, we do exact matching on region, gear type, and target species, since 
we believe the fishermen would be quite different if these characteristics were not similar. 
Within this group, we can then directly estimate E(y1i|selfmgti=1, Zi) and E(y0i|selfmgti=0, 
Zi), where the second term replaces the hypothetical counterfactual, E(y0i|selfmgti=1). This 
approach means that once we have a matched sample, we compare the economic outcome 
of the member fishermen with the economic outcome of the non-member fishermen. 
 We report the estimated coefficients that use the post-matching bias correction factor 
developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This correction factor is needed to correct for 
the conditional bias in finite samples when there are three or more continuous variables. 
Based on recent work that demonstrates that bootstrapping standard errors are invalid with 
non-smooth nearest neighbor estimators, we use Abadie and Imbens’s variance formula for 
nearest-neighbor estimators that are heteroskedasticity consistent. With covariate match-
ing, we report the results using two weighting matrices. one approach uses the inverse 
variance weighting scheme; the other uses the Mahalanobis metric weighting scheme. 
 To further control for unobserved covariates that may affect membership or the 
economic outcomes, we take advantage of the recall data for the baseline year and first 
difference the variables in equation (1). We, therefore, examine five different variables as 
economic outcomes (Δyi): directional change in total revenue and total cost and annual 
growth rate in profit, total revenue, and total cost. First differencing the membership sta-
tus will result in a dummy variable for selfmgti because, by definition, the baseline year is 
the one in which self management was established. This differencing procedure yields the 
so-called difference-in-difference matching, which controls for time-invariant unobserved 
variables that change in parallel between the member and non-member fishermen in addi-
tion to all the advantages of the matching method.
Unequal Sampling Probability
Due to the way the member and non-member fishermen were sampled, each fisherman 
has a different probability of being selected into our sample. The number of fishermen 
in each self-management group differs; therefore, the probability of a member fisherman 
being selected is inversely proportional to the size of the group. Moreover, the com-
munity size from which a non-member fisherman was sampled also differs. To take into 
account this unequal sampling probability, we weight the samples based on the inverse 
of the probability using the total number of fishermen in the self-management group or 
the fishing community to which the fisherman belongs. The size of the self-management 
group was determined by data from the group leader survey. The 2007 data for size of the 
fishing community from which the non-member fishermen were sampled came from un-
published data through the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (2008). We show 
both the weighted and unweighted estimates.
Two Measures of Self-management Effect
We are interested in two types of effects of self management on profitability: the average 
treatment on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect (ATE). ATT measures 
the effect of a self-management group on the profitability of the member fishermen. In 
other words, it quantifies how much better off the self-management members are than 
they would have been if they had not become a member. ATT can be expressed as E[y1i–
y0i|selfmgti=1]. In contrast, the ATE, which is expressed as E[y1i–y0i], measures the effect 
of self-management group on the entire sample; i.e., unconditional on membership status.
 In summary, we have five economic outcomes of interest: directional changes in total 
revenue and total cost and the average growth rate in profit, total revenue, and total cost. For 
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each of these outcomes, we show the estimates that use inverse distance and Mahalanobis 
metrics for matching. In addition, we show both ATT and ATE for all outcomes and weight-
ed and unweighted estimates. In total, we show estimates from 40 matching models. 
Results
Directional Change in Total Revenue and Cost
The covariate matching estimates for the effect of self management on directional chang-
es in revenue and cost suggest that being members of a self-management group benefits 
both the revenue and cost sides of fishing activities (table 6). The ATT estimates for total 
revenue suggest that when we compare member and non-member fishermen who are 
similar or exactly the same in the covariates, membership in a self-management group is 
likely to lead to an increase in revenue (columns 1 and 2). Moreover, the ATT estimates 
for total cost are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that membership in 
a self-management group is also likely to lead to a decrease in cost (columns 3 and 4). 
These results are generally consistent regardless of the metrics used for matching (inverse 
distance vs. Mahalanobis), weighted or unweighted using sampling weights. 
 The ATE estimates show that the benefits arising from forming or becoming a mem-
ber of self-management groups may also extend to non-member fishermen, but more 
so for revenue than cost. The ATE estimates for the directional change in total revenue 
are positive and significant, and the magnitudes are similar to ATT (columns 5 and 6). 
This result suggests that, on average, the matched non-member fishermen could benefit 
as much as the member fishermen in terms of higher revenue had they also become a 
member. The ATE estimates for directional change in total cost give a mixed result. The 
weighted estimates are negative and significant, suggesting that self-management mem-
bership will lower the cost for an average fisherman. However, the unweighted estimates 
are insignificant, suggesting that the unconditional effect of self management is zero. 
Again, these results are consistent across the two metrics, inverse distance and Mahalano-
bis metric. We believe that weighted estimates are more accurate given our sampling 
strategy; thus, it is more likely that the cost of fishing will decrease as a result of becom-
ing a member of a self-management group.
Average Growth Rate in Profit, Total Revenue, and Cost
When we examine the degree of change in profit, total revenue, and total cost, we find 
results that are consistent with the effect on directional change, although the estimates are 
not as statistically robust (table 7). The ATT estimates for the average growth rate in profit 
are positive, ranging from 16 to 23% (top table, columns 1 and 2). While the magnitude 
of the effect of self management on member fishermen is large, the estimates are signifi-
cant only at 10–20% significance level. When we break this down into revenue and cost, 
the ATT estimates for the average growth rate in total revenue ranged from 4 to 5%, and 
the estimates were statistically significant at the 1% level for the weighted estimates (col-
umns 3 and 4). on the other hand, the estimates for the average growth rate in total cost 
are insignificant (weighted) or only weakly significant (unweighted) (columns 5 and 6). 
 The ATE estimates show that the self management had no unconditional effect on 
overall growth in profit or revenue, but the estimates on total cost show that self manage-
ment had small unconditional effects in reducing costs (lower table, columns 1 to 6). The 
estimates range from –1.5 to –1.9% annual reductions in costs, and the results are consis-
tent across the two metrics for matching and weighted and unweighted.
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Conclusion
Based on theory of clubs, a critical incentive compatibility criterion for self-management 
groups of natural resources to sustain in the long run depends on whether or not managing 
the resource as a group results in economic gains for its members. This paper uses a unique 
set of data from South Korea and an empirical strategy to provide one of the first quantitative 
evidences that self management is benefiting fishermen. Overall, we find that membership in 
a self-management group benefits the member fishermen on both the revenue and cost sides 
of fishery activities. Although statistical evidence of the actual levels of change is not as ro-
bust, we find consistent, strong evidence that at least self management of fisheries is leading 
to increased revenue and decreased cost. These findings are encouraging indications that sup-
port the privileged condition for self-management groups to function as clubs.
 However, these results do not necessarily paint a rosy picture of self management for 
South Korea’s fisheries. Our finding merely supports the argument that member fisher-
men are not worse off. The finding that estimates of the impact on directional change 
were more robust than the extent of the change, suggests that the process might still be 
in progress in South Korea, and a longer timeframe may be necessary to observe a solid 
trend of increasing profit. Given that the average age of self-management groups is only 
about seven years, such an outcome is within one’s expectation, but it also means that 
much more self-management effort is needed. Nonetheless, the majority of member fish-
ermen perceive the change to be in the right direction, which suggests that members may 
have the incentive to maintain the group status for the time being.
 The results obtained in this study provide some policy implications for fishery self 
management in South Korea and beyond. First, the results show that, on average, self 
management of fisheries brings positive benefits not only to current members but po-
tentially to all non-members. As such, this finding could support the argument for South 
Korea’s government to continue its policy to promote and support the establishment and 
operation of self-management groups. This seems particularly important at this juncture 
where the positive trend is felt by many member fishermen, but tangible and measureable 
impacts are yet to arrive. Thus, it would be a great loss of opportunity if the government 
were to discontinue this endeavor.
 Secondly, one statistic that stood out compared to other countries’ self-management 
experience is the high share of South Korean self management dealing with finfish (figure 
1). Both the theory and typical case studies, including those in Japan, point out that im-
mobile species, such as shellfish and crustaceans, are more suited for self management 
than mobile species (e.g., ostrom et al. 2002).The ability to swim around makes the spe-
cies potentially difficult to co-manage, since they can easily straddle across the border of 
self-management groups. This implies that a self-management organization that adminis-
ters an area large enough to cover the movement of such species becomes necessary for 
effective management.
 The challenge, of course, is that larger self-management groups are often difficult to 
establish, let alone sustain. Common wisdom is that the smaller the group size, the more 
likely its endurance (olson 1965; ostrom et al. 2002). In fact, South Korean self-man-
agement groups have fewer members (average of 71) than non-self management groups. 
There will be a higher degree of heterogeneity, which could impede reaching any sensible 
consensus on self-imposed rules and other cooperative arrangements. Political forces will 
be much stronger, which could completely change the group’s direction (as seen in some 
U.S. coastal fishery management; e.g., Gaines 2008; Murphy 2008).
 In sum, there are advantages and disadvantages to enlarging the self-management 
group: cover the entire migration path of managed finfish species but with the possibility 
of increasing transaction costs among the members. A possible remedy is the coalition of 
self-management groups, as seen in Japan (Uchida and Makino 2008). By utilizing the 
pre-existing organizational hierarchy, it may be possible to keep transaction costs low.
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 Thirdly, the extent and the types of self-management activities currently adopted by 
self-management groups indicate that there is still significant room for further utilizing 
advantages of self management. For example, the most popular self-management ac-
tivities in our sample were cleaning fishing grounds, monitoring for poachers, removing 
pests, and information exchange. Although all of these are important fishery management 
activities, their impacts on enhancing total revenue or reducing costs are passive at best. 
one of the key strengths of self management—and collective management in general—is 
the ability to engage in activities that are ineffective if done individually but potentially 
very effective if done as a group. Such an example is joint marketing and quality control.
 In Japan, for example, more and more fishing cooperatives are starting their own 
retail shops and internet sales.6 The concept is to cut the middleman and present their 
products as the freshest available to a consumer. Since Japanese consumers are very se-
lective about the freshness of fish, this method is fairly low-tech and yet quite effective to 
differentiate their product from others. Similarly, South Korea’s self-management groups 
may take advantage of these strategies to differentiate their products and increase sales.
 Finally, in the survey sample there was only one case where the respondent men-
tioned revenue sharing. Unfortunately, we do not know the details of how this is actually 
done, but it could be something very similar to what several studies have found in Japan 
(Gaspart and Seki 2003; Platteau and Seki 2001; Seki 2000; Uchida and Baba 2008; 
Uchida and Watanobe 2008). A pooling arrangement, as it is often termed, is recently 
garnering attention from the theoretical front as well, with results generally being positive 
about its effect on successful self management. The key driving force for this outcome is 
the fact that a pooling arrangement aligns individual incentive (profit maximization) to 
that of a group as a whole (maximize total profit).
                      Members of Self-               Non-members
                   management Groups
Figure 1. Proportion of the Primary Target Species Type, Members of
Self-management Groups vs. Non-members, 2007
Source: Authors’ data.
6 Personal communication with Dr. osamu Baba of Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology and 
fishery cooperative association members.
Uchida, Uchida, Lee, Ryu, and Kim58
 It will be difficult to convince fishermen to accept this regime. Even in Japan where 
more than 20% of self-management groups have adopted a pooling arrangement, fisher-
men will typically resist its implementation initially. But some of those fishermen are 
now doing fairly well, at least when one considers the environment in which they operate 
(Uchida and Baba 2008; Uchida and Watanobe 2008). 
 The risk of a pooling arrangement is of course the prospect of free-riding. The lesson 
from the Japanese experience, as is consistent with the Folk Theorem in game theory, is 
that as a result of a pooling arrangement the members must be better off than without it. 
In a repeated infinite game, any incentive compatible strategy can be supported as Nash 
equilibrium. Thus, if it is the fishermen’s interest to maintain the pooling arrangement and 
self-management group for the current period, then they will do so for all subsequent peri-
ods. Thus, we are back to our previous point, that self-management groups should put more 
effort in direct profit enhancement (revenue increasing and/or cost reduction) activities.
References
Abadie, A., and G.W. Imbens. 2006. Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for 
Average Treatment Effects. Econometrica 74(1):235–67.
Agrawal, A. 2001. Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Re-
sources. World Development 29(10):1649–72.
Anderson, J. 2008. Rights Based Management in the United Kingdom: The Shetland 
Experience. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance, R.E. Townsend, R. Shot-
ton, and H. Uchida, eds., pp. 53–65. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504. Rome: 
FAo.
Black, D.A., and J.A. Smith. 2004. How Robust is the Evidence on the Effects of College 
Quality? Evidence from Matching. Journal of Econometrics 121(1–2):99–124.
Buchanan, J.M. 1965. An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica 32(125):1–14.
Cheong, S.-M. 2004. Managing Fishing at the Local Level: The Role of Fishing Village 
Cooperatives in Korea. Coastal Management 32:191–202.
Cunningham, S., and T. Bostock. 2005. Successful Fisheries Management: Issues, 
Case Studies and Perspectives, 238 p. Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon Academic 
Publishers.
Gaines, R. 2008. Days at Sea to Undergo Minor Cuts, for Now. Gloucester Daily Times. 
September 5.
Gaspart, F., and E. Seki. 2003. Cooperation, Status Seeking and Competitive Behaviour: 
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51:51–77.
Jentoft, S. 2003. Co-management - The Way Forward. The Fisheries Co-management 
Experience: Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects, D.C. Wilson, J.R. Nielsen, 
and P. Dengbol, eds., pp. 1–14. Fish and Fisheries Series. Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Johnston, R.J., and J.G. Sutinen. 2009. One Last Chance: The Economic Case for a New 
Approach to Fisheries Management in New England, 21 p. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Environmental Group.
Lee, K.N., J.M. Gates, and J.-S. Lee. 2006. Recent Developments in Korean Fisheries 
Management. Ocean and Coastal Management 49:355–66.
Makino, M. 2008. Marine Protected Areas for the Snow Crab Bottom Fishery off Kyoto 
Prefecture, Japan. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance, R.E. Townsend, R. 
Shotton, and H. Uchida, eds., pp. 163–73. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 504. 
Rome: FAo.
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. 2008. 2008 Comanagement Implementation 
Plan (Yondo Jayul Granry Yeoup Choojim Gehwoek).
Murphy, E.D. 2008. Regulators, Fishing Industry Spar over Plans to Cut Days at Sea. 
Fishery Self Management in South Korea 59
Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday Telegram. october 15.
olson, M., Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard Economic Studies, 186 p. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P.C. Stern, S. Stonich, and E.U. Weber. 2002. The Drama 
of the Commons, 521 p. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Platteau, J.-P., and E. Seki. 2001. Community Arrangements to overcome Market Fail-
ures: Pooling Groups in Japanese Fisheries. Communities and Markets in Economic 
Development, M. Aoki and Y. Hayami, eds., pp. 344–402. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
_____. 2007. Heterogeneity, Social Esteem and Feasibility of Collective Action. Journal 
of Development Economics 83: 302–25.
Rosenbaum, P.R., and D.B. Rubin. 1983. The Central Role of the Propensity Score in ob-
servational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrika 70(1): 41–55.
Schott, S., N.J. Buckley, S. Mestelman, and R.A. Muller. 2007. output Sharing in Part-
nerships as a Common Pool Resource Management Instrument. Environmental and 
Resource Economics 37:697–711.
Seki, E. 2000. Community as a Solution to Market Failures: Pooling Groups in Japa-
nese Fisheries. Ph.D. Dissertation, Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix-Namur, 
Facult·des Sciences Economiques.
Townsend, R.E., R. Shotton, and H. Uchida. 2008. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-gover-
nance, 451 p. FAo Fisheries Technical Paper No. 504. Rome: FAo.
Uchida, H., and o. Baba. 2008. Fishery Management and the Pooling Arrangement in 
the Sakuraebi Fishery in Japan. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance, R.E. 
Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. Uchida, eds., pp. 175–89. FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper No. 504. Rome: FAo.
Uchida, H., and M. Makino. 2008. Japanese Coastal Fishery Co-management: An over-
view. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance, R.E. Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. 
Uchida, eds., pp. 221–29. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 504. Rome: FAO.
Uchida, H., and M. Watanobe. 2008. Walleye Pollack (suketoudara) Fishery Management 
in the Hiyama Region of Hokkaido, Japan. Case Studies in Fisheries Self-gover-
nance, R.E. Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. Uchida, eds., pp. 163–73. FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper No. 504. Rome: FAo.
Wilson, D.C., J.R. Nielsen, and P. Dengbol. 2003. The Fisheries Co-management Experi-
ence: Accomplishments, Challenges and Prospects. Fish and Fisheries Series, 324 p. 
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zhao, Z. 2004. Using Matching to Estimate Treatment Effects: Data Requirements, 
Matching Metrics, and Monte Carlo Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics 
86(1):91–107.

